

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Morning News

STATION WTOP TV  
CBS Network

DATE August 8, 1972 7:00 A.M.

CITY Washington, D.C.

ALFRED MCCOY INTERVIEWED

NELSON BENTON: Alfred McCoy is the author of a soon-to-be-published book entitled "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The already published excerpts and Mr. McCoy's testimony before a Senate committee have triggered a controversy in government. A principal allegation of the book is that the Central Intelligence Agency has frequently looked the other way and allowed its operatives and airplanes to be used for routing heroin from what Mr. McCoy calls the Gold Triangle in Southeast Asia; that triangle overlapping parts of Burma, Thailand and Laos.

His book was delayed in publication while the CIA looked it over, and the CIA has written a rebuttal to McCoy's charges. They wrote the letter to the publisher.

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" is published by Harper & Row.

Mr. McCoy, the Golden Triangle that you refer to is behind us. Could you just outline how you alleged that heroin comes into South Vietnam and into the United States from that part of the world.

ALFRED MCCOY: Right. Within the Gold Triangle itself, about seventy percent of the world's illicit opium supply is produced. And there're two major corridors out of the Triangle. One is kind of an overland corridor which begins as a maze of mule trails in northeastern Burma, right up there, and moves down through Thailand, across the northern Thai border and down through the highways of Thailand to the ports along the Gulf of Siam right down there. And from there its major route is by Thai trawler to Hong Kong where there's a very, very large complex of heroin laboratories producing a very, very high grade of heroin for American consumers.

Then from there it moves into this country from Hong Kong either through Europe, through Latin America or directly across the Pacific into the West Coast.

The other major route is an air corridor which begins among the scattered dirt runways of northern Laos, ends up in Saigon. And then from there it proceeds either in the form of morphine base to the heroin laboratories of Europe or in the form of pure heroin directly across the Pacific to the United States, routes through Europe into the East Coast of the United States, or again goes through Latin America and then comes up in the United States.

So there're two major routes out of the Gold Triangle region.

Now the basic group that is involved in the traffic that provides sort of management expertise, technical skills, runs the laboratories, makes the connections, are in Southeast Asia, are Chinese. These are indigenous, nonpolitical Chinese syndicate which operates among the overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia and seems to manage most of the technical details of the traffic.

Transport in the region and political protection for the traffic is provided by high ranking officials in the various governments -- Thai, Laotian and the South Vietnamese government.

BENTON: You don't mention -- you don't mention Burma. And Nelson Gross of the State Department in testimony I believe on the same day that you appeared before the Senate Government Operations Committee said that the majority of opium was produced in Burma rather than -- and that it was produced under the auspices of a man by the name of Lo Sing Han (?), I believe. And you don't refer to him, do you?

McCOY: In my book I discuss him. The way that the traffic in northeastern Burma works is that the local level of the traffic, actually collecting it from the tribes and collecting protection duty from local caravans into every region is controlled by local warlords. Almost all of northeastern Burma is out of control of the government. And it's controlled by either rebels, just pure bandits, or pro-government militia, all of whom are very, very autonomous from anybody.

BENTON: What are your allegations about the CIA's involvement or indifference to this traffic?

McCOY: Yes. There've been a number of cases consistently throughout the history of the traffic in Southeast Asia where the CIA's recruited local mercenaries from the indigenous population,

whether it be Laotian, whether it be the various kinds of hill tribes -- Meo, Yau (?), whatever. And it provided aid facilities, transport for these indigenous mercenaries without making any -- you know, without providing any restrictions on the use of this aid, use of the transport for the opium traffic. In many cases it was actually consciously known that what they were giving was going to be used to further the narcotics traffic without doing anything about it.

And there're a couple of really extraordinary cases. For example in that rebuttal to my book by the CIA, which you have in front of you, they say -- they in there talk about the involvement in the traffic of a gentleman named Major Chau La (?). Major Chau La was commander of CIA mercenary troops, or is commander of CIA mercenary troops in northwestern Laos. And he's operated since 1965 an opium refinery. That refinery was -- the location was known by the CIA case officer in the region. As a matter of fact, at one point the CIA moved one of its top secret bases -- actually shifted its location by quite a distance in order to get it away from the refinery because the refinery -- there were caravans coming in; merchants were coming in; buyers were coming in and out. And they were afraid that the existence of the refinery compromised the clandestine nature of its base. So they actually moved their base to get away from the refinery.

The CIA claims the destruction of that refinery, you know, in mid 1971 as an example of its commitment to any narcotics work. What they don't say is they knew that refinery had operated for six years prior to that destruction with its full knowledge and full complicity.

BARRY SARAFIN: Well, Mr. McCoy, this is Barry Sarafin in Washington. Why would the CIA get involved in drug traffic? Why would it knowingly go along with it?

McCOY: It's not a question of corruption on the individual -- in the case of individual CIA officers. It's not a matter of the agency drawing any kind of financial resources from the drug traffic. It's a simple matter of adjusting oneself to the political realities of the situation.

In Southeast Asia the CIA in the Gold Triangle region has allied itself with a number of indigenous tribal groups whose major cash crop is opium. They've mobilized the total resources of these tribes in order to fight the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Army in northern Laos. The major cash crop of these people is opium. Therefore the CIA has bowed themselves [sic] to the economic realities, the political imperatives of the situation and simply compromised itself to the traffic.

It has always been that fighting the war, that pursuing the political and military objectives was the most important thing that the CIA had to do or that the United States government, in general, had to do, and that all forms of corruption or all forms of the economy that we didn't approve of, like the opium traffic, was something we couldn't deal with now, something we'd deal with later, perhaps maybe never. But the important thing was the war. And we pursued that with full vigor, letting everything else go aside.

BENTON: Well, the CIA says that it has engaged in a number of -- in its rebuttal it says that it engaged in a number of programs to combat this. There has been the removal of a Vietnamese General, General Dzu, I believe, who was alleged to have been connected. There was a pretty big fuss in Thailand just eight or ten days ago.

Do you say that the CIA is still ignoring it or isn't it and other government agencies trying to halt this traffic?

McCOY: I say that, let's say, until mid 1971 certainly there was almost no effort on the part of United States officials in Southeast Asia to do anything seriously about the narcotics traffic. You had a case, for example, where the largest heroin laboratory in Southeast Asia, one of the largest laboratories in the world, was operating openly, with full knowledge for two years of U. S. officials. This is the Bon Hoa Top (?) Laboratory. Its brand, the WO Gold Brand, has turned up in New York, all up and down the eastern seaboard. It's moving to this country in enormous quantity. It was the major source of heroin that addicted U. S. GI's in South Vietnam. The laboratory was operated by the commander-in-chief of the Royal Laotian Army, an army that was receiving almost a hundred percent of its military aid from the United States government. We did nothing to close down that laboratory until mid 1971 when there was public pressure on the part of Congress and the public to do something about the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

Since then narcotics has become a priority. But it's by no means the top priority. It's no longer possible to say that the complicity is [as] extreme as I've talked about in the past. It's definitely -- you know, there's been some improvement. However, it is still a very, very long way from doing anything positive about correcting the drug traffic.

For example, all of the massive seizures that the administration has listed in great detail in a number of reports still comprise less than about three percent of the total opium production in the region, which leaves ninety-seven percent to come out.

BENTON: We're running out of time, and there're a couple of questions I'd like to get to. Isn't it unusual to submit a book to a government agency to let them read it before publication?

McCOY: Yes, it's extremely unusual. I myself didn't agree with the decision on the part of my publisher. But I understand my publisher's reason for doing so. My publisher was simply -- simply believes that the government agency makes a request for a manuscript and you should have -- as a publisher have enough confidence in what you're publishing to be able to show it to anybody at anytime at any stage during the publication process.

I myself feel that although the review compromised my principles, my belief that this is certainly -- I feel certainly -- well, if it had been carried through it would have been a violation of my First Amendment freedoms and could have set a very, very dangerous precedent for the press in this country. On the other hand, I think there would be a strength in my position. I think what the CIA has had to say in rebuttal to my book is absolutely pathetic. Their argumentation is extremely weak, extremely vague. And some of my most controversial sections, the most detailed section which I detailed very, very closely -- the CIA's cross-border operations into China, its clandestine operations in northeastern Burma and their total involvement in the opium traffic, which is the most detailed portion of the entire book on the CIA -- the CIA said not one word about, no comment whatsoever.

BENTON: You made no changes as a result of...

McCOY: No. Absolutely not changes were made. As a matter of fact, Harper & Row, people at Harper & Row were, I guess, really amused and dumbstruck by the incredible disparity between the CIA's initial overtures, which were extremely strong, extremely militant. At one point in their correspondence they actually said "If you decide to publish the book." They thought they were really going to get Harper & Row to...

BENTON: Well, aren't you -- do you really know what the CA thinks?

McCOY: Oh, does anybody really know what the CIA thinks, including the CIA? But that's a whole...

BENTON: Well, let me ask you about a quote from -- I think it came from a former CIA agent who must have been one of your sources, may have been one of your sources. He said that

had the CIA not jumped into this with its criticism of your book you may have sold four thousand copies. And what I'm going to is, how much -- I have to ask you this -- how much of what you're doing now is to hypo sales for a book that's coming out in less than two weeks? Your appearances before a congressional committee -- I realize this is done as a scholarly work, you spent eighteen months in southeast Asia checking this out, but how much does an author do of this nature to -- to sell a book that he believes in?

McCOY: I don't know. All I can simply say is when I started this book, it was going to be a paperback; there were maybe going to be three, four, or five thousand copies printed. I did all of the work on the book. I put in all the effort on the book on the basis of that knowledge and the basis of that understanding. It's only been really during the latter stages of production of the book that it was actually moved to a trade book. And since the CIA's overtures, which just began two months ago after the book was done, after my scheduled -- my appearances before Congress were scheduled, that the book has become such a major issue.

I thought it would be an interesting topic. In the beginning I thought it was purely academic. When it became controversial and the nature of the traffic changed, I thought it might be of public interest. I had no idea that it was going to -- to mushroom in such huge proportions. As a matter of fact, it's causing enormous complications in my life. I just don't have the time to do things.

BENTON: We have some complications in our life: we're running out of time. Mr. McCoy, thank you very much for being with us this morning.

McCOY: Thank you very much.

# Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the first step toward abandoning the First Amend-

ment protection against prior censorship."

McCoy cited "extralegal actions" taken by the CIA to obstruct the book's publications. He said, "Visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the telephone calls, and the letters are extralegal attempts by the CIA to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

Thomas replied in a July 18

letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supporting his thesis, and he appears to have ignored available information."

contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's book is to do a disservice to this fight and to dishearten the many sincere people in CIA who are at least as concerned about this menace as Mr. McCoy."

In his book, McCoy argues that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic

at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example, McCoy said that Air America—"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in such traffic."

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had been operating since 1965 with the agency's full knowledge," he said.

Elisabeth Jakob, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug. 17.

# Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the first step in abandoning the First Amendment protection against prior censorship."

letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supporting his thesis, and he appears to have ignored available information which might contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr.

at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example, McCoy said that Air America—"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in such traffic."

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had

been operating since 1965 with the agency's full knowledge," he said.

Elisabeth Jakab, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug. 17.



31 JULY 1972

Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000100040006-6

# Harper to Show CIA Proofs of New Book on Asian Drug Traffic

## Marchetti Book on CIA Still Under Suit

Harper & Row has decided, after much consideration, to honor a request from the Central Intelligence Agency to see page proofs of Alfred W. McCoy's controversial September 13 book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," and to consider "factual" corrections that the CIA may offer. The publisher, however, has made no advance commitment to accept any requested changes.

In his book, written with Cathleen B. Read, Mr. McCoy, a 26-year-old student in Yale's Ph.D. program in history, alleges that French, Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have used the traffic in opium and heroin in Southeast Asia for their own ends, and that the CIA and other U.S. agencies have either accepted or have responded inadequately to the situation. Mr. McCoy told Congressional committees early in June (including the foreign operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire, D., Wis., of the Senate Appropriations Committee), that he had had more than 250 interviews about the drug traffic, including talks with CIA and South Vietnamese officials, and that President Thieu and Premier Kiem were involved: he gave details of many allegations which appear also in the book. B. Brooks Thomas, Harper vice-president and general counsel, tells *PW* he and the editors have worked closely with Mr. McCoy on the manuscript, have insisted on documentation of all material points, and have had outside experts read it. As a result, Harper & Row is convinced that the book is well-documented, scholarly and deserves to be published.

A chapter from the book, adapted, appears in the July *Harper's* magazine. The magazine has received a letter from the CIA's executive director, W. E. Colby, denying allegations involving the CIA. *Harper's* reportedly plans to publish the letter soon. Mr. Colby and an officer of Air America (a contract airline which does work for CIA in Southeast Asia) also wrote to the *Washington Star*, disputing allegations picked up by a *Star* columnist from Mr. McCoy's findings. In these protests, and in its approach to

Harper & Row, the CIA is said to be departing sharply from its usual policy of silence concerning criticism.

Harper & Row was approached early in June, when a representative called upon Cass Canfield, Sr., former chief executive, now a senior editor for the firm, and said the agency understood the McCoy manuscript contained serious allegations about CIA and other agencies—allegations that he said might be libelous to individuals or severely damaging to the national interest. The representative spoke also to M. S. Wyeth, Jr., executive editor of the trade department. The Harper officials said the manuscript was not yet ready to be read, but that the request would be considered.

In weighing their decision, Harper & Row officials and editors talked among themselves and with respected publishing colleagues, including experts in the field of the freedom to read. On June 30, Mr. Thomas wrote to the CIA asking the agency to state its request, with reasons for it, in writing. The reply, dated July 5, came from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the CIA. He wrote that the CIA was in no way questioning Harper & Row's right to publish the book, but said, "We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims" about the CIA were "totally false" or "distorted" or "based on unconvincing evidence."

Harper & Row then decided to let the CIA see the book—subject to the author's approval, without which, Harper & Row president Winthrop Knowlton told *PW*, the CIA's request would not be accepted. The author finally accepted the decision, to let the CIA look at page proofs only, and to give a quick reply, with Harper & Row reserving all its options and reaffirming its right to publish.

"As head of the house of Harper & Row," Mr. Knowlton told *PW*, "I am sensitive, like all my colleagues in publishing, to the problem of censorship, and if I felt this request involved censorship we would not be agreeing to it. In view of the gravity of the allegations, we simply think this is the most responsible

way we can publish this book."

Ironically, in view of CIA efforts to refute the charges by Mr. McCoy and others, personnel of CIA, State and the Department of Defense completed in February a report to the Cabinet Committee on Narcotics Control which buttressed many of the charges, according to Seymour Hersh in a front page *New York Times* story, July 24. Mr. Hersh reviewed the Harper-CIA discussions in the *Times* of July 22.

The CIA's procedure with respect to Mr. McCoy's book is in sharp contrast to government action on an as-yet-unwritten book, a nonfiction work about the CIA, which Victor L. Marchetti is under contract to prepare for Knopf. In that case, the Justice Department obtained in April a restraining order to prevent Mr. Marchetti from publishing the proposed book, on the ground that it would be likely to divulge currently classified information in violation of a secrecy agreement that Mr. Marchetti had made as a CIA employee. Mr. Marchetti worked for the CIA for 14 years and resigned in 1969. He then wrote a novel, "The Rope Dancer" (*Grosset*), based on his observations.

Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., U. S. District Court, Alexandria, Va., in issuing the restraining order, ruled that Mr. Marchetti's agreement with the CIA "takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment." The American Civil Liberties Union, representing Mr. Marchetti, denies this and argues that the author cannot in fact sign away his First Amendment rights. The Association of American Publishers and the Authors League have filed *amicus curiae* briefs supporting Mr. Marchetti in further court proceedings. (See *PW*, April 24, June 5, June 12.)